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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 345 
Accident time: 10:55 Accident Date: 17/03/2000 
Where it occurred: Gluva Smokva, 
midway between 
Trebinje and 
Dubrovnik 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 29/03/2000 
ID original source: 1002-RB/BK/VMM/PB Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
rocks/stones 
route (verge) 
soft 
Date record created: 21/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: 20251 26089 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: JNA Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet: 625-3-2 
Map name: 1:25,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
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Accident report 
The following is the MAC’s Accident report, edited for anonymity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A Board of Inquiry was convened by BH MAC Director to investigate the circumstances of 
deminer's accident that happened March 17 2000, Gluva Smokva – Trebinje, at a demining 
site of NGO [Demining group] (Board of Inquiry see Annex B). Initial Report was received in 
BHMAC at 11,57 March 17 (See Annex A). According to the BH Standard, Board of Inquiry 
left Sarajevo at 14,00 hrs on March 17 and reached Trebinje at the previously agreed time at 
09,00 on March 18 2000. A QA inspector form RU MAC Pale was on the site when the 
accident occurred and he gathered the written statements of the personnel present at the 
moment of the accident (See Annex C). [Annexes not made available.] 
Deminer's accident involved one deminer/dog-handler. [The victim] suffered from injury to his 
left heel bone. Casevac and medevac procedures where done properly. The injured was 
evacuated to Trebinje hospital where he was operated on. It has been stated in the hospital 
that he lost approximately 50% of his heel bone. Apart from the Board of Inquiry, there were 
representatives from Trebinje Civil Police (they did not leave the control point due to safety 
reasons). They took the basic information from present personnel and the members of the 
Board.  
Members of the Board of Inquiry were as follows: 
Chairman – Coord Dept BH MAC 
Member – Coord Dept BH MAC 
Member - RU Pale MAC RS  
Observer  
Members of the Board of Inquiry gathered March 18 2000 at 09,30, at the control point of 
[Demining group] NGO, location Gluva Smokva – Trebinje. Also present at the site were RS 
PIU monitor, ITF monitor, [Demining group] ops officer, Chairman of the [Demining group] 
NGO and two complete demining teams that were conducting demining on that day.  
 
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND TASKING PROCEDURES 
NGO [Demining group] Pale was tasked with ID No 1000254 (60000 m2) at Gluva Smokva 
location, which is on half way from Trebinje towards Dubrovnik. The map on which the task is 
shown is JNA 1: 25000, sheet No 625-3-2, grid references x = 20251 and y = 26089. Task 
was set by MAC RS and financed through International Trust Fund. Priority to this task was 
given due to widen the safe area along the road Trebinje – Dubrovnik, IEBL area. Request for 
the Red folder was submitted December 13, since the area has already been surveyed in the 
period from December 07 to December 10 1999. (Annex D – Survey report and the sketch of 
the area) BH MAC made a set of information while the RS MAC issued the Red Folder on 
February 16 2000. 
The task was opened on February 16 2000, by breaking a safe access lane from the left side 
of the asphalt road, by the devastated house into the depth. 
 
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER 
Weather was very convenient for demining operations since it was raining the day before 
(Wednesday, March 16). It was raining previously as well, as stated by CER-1 team leader. 
After six days leave, first day at the site Gluva Smokva is March 17 2000.  Exact place where 
the accident occurred is a smaller part of soil-covered area, while the rest is rocky. The period 
when this part was cleared is between February 18 – February 20 2000, as stated by team 
leader. 
The accident occurred at approximately 120th metre of two metres wide safe lane (it is not 
possible to state is exactly since the safe lane is cut at places with big rocks and stone 
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plates), 2 metres to the left. The safe lane has been cut to the left side of the main road 
Trebinje – Dubrovnik.  
The terrain is mostly rocky with sparse soil areas not larger than 40 m2, with thorny bushes 
up to 1.8 m high and hard to go through, which makes the area very hard to work through. 
There are few slopes as well, though not too steep.  
Access to the site is from the road. There is a devastated house on the road, to the right side 
of the safe lane. On the opposite side of the main road there are designated areas: control 
point / safe area, rest area, medical area, area for checking metal detectors, and an area for 
EDDs. Cleared and marked access lane is however hard to walk through because of the rock 
and a few stony slopes.  
There are yellow-tipped pickets in the lane where the previous mines were found (21 mines, 9 
PMA-2 and 12 PMR-2A until the day of the accident. Accident happened up to two metres 
form the left edge of the safe lane, on the cleared area (missed mine). 
Photographs of the accident given in Annex E. [Annex not made available although some 
pictures were.] 
 
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
The site layout and demining methods were dictated with the specific geography of the 
ground. The site layout is in compliance with BH Standard and [Demining group] Pale SOP.  
 
[The accident site is shown above.] 
The marking itself was done properly, having in consideration very hard conditions for work 
and marking. Where possible, marking stakes for bordering the safe lane from the suspect 
area are flushed into ground at a prescribed distance of 2 metres, where not possible, stakes 
where put among big stones. They are connected with mine tape at ground level or tape is 
put under the rocks. Designated areas are properly marked as well. 
 
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
Chief of the project on behalf of the PIU was [Name excised]. 
ITF monitor visited the site, while PIU monitor and [Demining group] ops officer were on site 
at all times. According to all reports, there were no faults noticed at the site. There was a 
medic with an ambulance at a site at all time for medical support.  
Inspectors' reports are attached in Annex F, [not made available] also saying there were no 
mistakes and breaching procedures. Three QA inspections were done before the accident 
happened, with a separate report for each team. 
Medical support was at the control point so the medic could reach the accident site very 
quickly. Medical evacuation was conducted on a satisfied level in a very short time. When the 
explosion happened, (10:55) medic was on the control point. He reached for his medical bag 
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and forwarded to the place of the detonation. One deminer waited for him in the safe lane and 
detected the area once again in order to make him a safe entrance towards [the Victim]. The 
deminer re-checked the area with the detector to make it safe for the medical to approach the 
wounded. [The Victim] was taken care at the spot and was transferred to Trebinje hospital at 
11:10 hrs. 
Productivity on sight before the accident was the approximate of 70-80 m2 per deminer, 
which is, considering the type of area, quite high except for the days when the dogs were 
used. 
Daily monitors' reports are attached in Annex G. 
Daily ops officers' reports are attached in Annex H. [Annexes not made available.] 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
Daily progress in demining and the compliance to procedure in total are taken from 
inspectors' reports, daily reports, monitors' reports and attached quality control inspections' 
reports. 
RO inspectors found no mistakes in the work of the organisation so far, though the Board of 
Inquiry was not able to see the inspector’s reports. Safe lane is two metres wide, with 10 cm 
overlap on each side. The lane is correctly marked as much as the conditions on the ground 
allowed. 
According to the report of both inspectors and The Board, the approved SOP was on site. 
Internal quality control checks have been conducted and are attached in Annex I. Accident 
happened during planning of the internal quality control by two EDD teams. 
Since the site is opened on February 16 2000, RO MAC Pale had conducted 3 + 1 
inspections on this particular site. 
 
TASKING, REPORTING AND COMMUNICATIONS 
In coordination with MAC RO Pale [Demining group] organisation had opened the task ID 
1000254 on February 16 2000. The works on the site started the same day by making a safe 
lane to the left of the main road. 
(Sketch of the task / place of the accident attached in Annex D.) [Not made available.] 
The work on demining usually starts at 08.00 hrs. 
First break is from 09.00 until 09.30. After the break the team leader is usually deploying 
deminers and tasking them. 
PIU monitor provided his regular daily reports. 
Communication on site is conducted through hand held radio stations for each team leader, 
the medic and the ops officer. Immediate communication is conducted through the HF 
communication with the ops room at Pale.  
 
MEDICAL COVERAGE 
Dog handler / deminer [the Victim] who was involved in the accident had activated a mine by 
pressure in the cleared area. Due to the nature of the injury he remained conscious all the 
time. Medic arrived immediately after the explosion with a deminer in front checking the area 
again. He was stabilised at the spot and transferred to Trebinje hospital for further treatment. 
As for what we know so far [the Victim] had lost about 50% of his heel bone, but is generally 
feeling good. He is transferred to the specialised medical facility for further treatment. The 
entire medical treatment has been conducted very efficiently. 
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PERSONNEL INVOLVED 
The Ops officer for this site during the accident. There were also the PIU RS monitor, as well 
as CER  team leader. The rest of the personnel are as follows: 
The team leader 
Another dog handler 
[The Victim]  
The medic 
At the site ID1000254 – road Trebinje - Dubrovnik  the teams worked the way it has been 
presented in the daily reports. 
 
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
The tools and equipment the teams used contained of Ebinger metal detectors, prodders, 
spades, shears, helmets with visors and protective jackets. During the Board of Inquiry visit 
the detectors were tested since the deminers have re-cleared the area both with detectors 
and prodders in order for the Board to approach the crater. Place of the accident was not 
disturbed until the Board of Inquiry arrived. 
The prodders used by these demining teams were not adequate to the terrain where the 
demining was conducted. They are locally produced, 10 mm in diameter, with a part banded 
for the hand and a short sharpened end. 
At the day of the accident it took a lot of force to prod into the depth of 8 cm, though it rained 
a day before and the ground was softened due to rain. 
The area where accident happened was manually cleared with prodder.  The mine was 
'missed'. 
 
DETAILS ON EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INVOLVED 
The item that led to the accident is, as supposed by the BoI members, an AP mine PMA-2 set 
to be pressure activated by stepping on its prong. Leftovers of the mine were not found. As 
stated by the BoI members, mine was buried into the ground at the depth of 11-12 cm 
measured from the top of the crater (there is a 5 cm high pile of grass cut long time ago). 
Crater itself is of the oval shape, 22 cm wide, 40 cm long and 15 cm deep. Two stones of the 
size of an egg where found inside the crater, where the explosion occurred. 
Trebinje Police was notified the same day at 11.30 and had conducted their own investigation 
a day after the accident (March 18 2000). They only collected the statements of the personnel 
present at the site, including the BoI.  
 
EVIDENCE OF MINING - REMINING 
There is no evidence of remining connected to this accident. While walking over the area 
where the explosion occurred, the dog handlers noticed no signs of the ground having been 
disturbed. 
 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED ON MARCH 17 2000 
08.00 hrs, arrival at the site, ops officer issued the tasks. 
After first 30 minutes of work a 10 minutes break was given. This way of work continued until 
the breakfast break that is usually from 09.30 until 10.00 hrs. 
It has been planned immediately before the accident occurred that [the Team Leader] would 
introduce the dog handlers with the areas where internal control by EDD teams was 
supposed to be carried out.  
Explosion occurred at 10.55 hrs. One dog handler passed over the spot where the accident 
happened. Both of the handlers were going over the area they were supposed to check with 
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their EDDs, since it was one of the rare 'soil covered' areas within the cleared part of the site. 
The Victim] was following the first dog handler and activated the mine by pressure. No dogs 
were with them at the time.  
 
[The crater was in soft, peaty soil as shown above.] 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
There were 5 deminers' accidents on the wider Trebinje area, not counting this one. Two of 
them happened on cleared area as well. Particularity of mining in this area is frequent 
occurrence of AP mines PMA-2 buried beside their normal depth, between 12 – 18 cm, which 
itself presents a difficulty of locating the object either with the prodder or the detector. 
Apart from what is just mentioned, soil on this terrain (not the very spot where this accident 
happened) is rich in minerals and metal content, which is an additional difficulty to the efficient 
work of the metal detector. 
Since the organisation used the Ebex 420 PB detectors known for their narrow head, they 
were able to check the ground between the thick bushes, which further enabled them to use 
the motor cutting, saw for removing vegetation. (In accordance with BH Standard). 
 
SUMMARY 
[The Victim] had activated a PMA-2 AP mine by pressure. The other dog handler walked the 
same area in front of him. As stated by [the Victim] himself, he walked with the second 
handler into previously cleared area that was supposed to be controlled internally and which 
was to be presented to them by the team leader. The area was not cut in boxes yet. It is not 
yet clear why the handler went into the area before the team leader defined a clear task and 
before the task was not cut into boxes.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
1)  As stated in the report, the area given is very hard to deminer. 
2)  Prodder used was not adequate to this type of terrain. No one spotted the inadequacy of 
the tools (deminers, ops officer, monitors, inspectors). Prodder must be able to prod to the 
depth of the 10 cm without using force, which is not applicable for the prodder used. 
3)  If detector signalled the presence of the metal (identification of the mine), both the stones 
around it and inadequate prodder disabled the identification of the item (prodder most 
probably hit one of the stones, so the mine remained missed. 
4)  Productivity of over 100 m2 cannot guarantee the cleared area according to the BH 
Standard. 
5)  The site was not disturbed before the BoI arrived. 
6)  Supervision and internal Quality control were conducted in compliance to the BH 
Standard. 
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 RECOMMENDATIONS 
1)  Demining tools must NECESSARILY be adequate to the area being cleared. The 
diameter and the sharpened end of the prodder must enable the deminer to prod without 
force in order to locate the item at the minimum depth of 10 cm. 
2)  Due to great number of demining accidents in this area, it is necessary to find out more 
efficient and safer procedures for removal of mines. It will take a separate working group of 
demining organisations that have experience in this area in order to reach these procedures.  
3)  Until the efficient and safer procedures are reached, the Board of Inquiry recommends the 
circling of the task within the borders already cleared and final marking between the suspect 
and the cleared area, so that the cleared area can be handed over to RS MAC according to 
BH Standard. The task would count as much as 30 000 m2. 
4)  Since the mine was 'missed' and activated on the cleared area, Board of Inquiry 
recommends re-clearance of the cleared area with four EDD teams over the same area 
previously boxed. Lanes between boxes are to be re-cleared with two EDD teams followed by 
manual methods. 
5)  Productivity is not in compliance with the conditions on the site. 
 
ANNEXES [Not made available. Some photographs were.] 
A   Initial report 
B   Board of Inquiry members 
C   Written reports of the personnel at the site 
D  Survey report with a sketch of the site and a sketch of the place where the accident 
occurred. 
E   Photographs of the task and the accident spot 
F   Inspectors’ reports 
G   Daily and monitor’s reports 
H   Internal QC reports 
 
Signed: all BOI members 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 437 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Foot 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
7 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victim 
was walking in an area prior to confirming it as clear with dogs, and before the area was 
marked out for the dog QA. The procedures in place at the site appear to have been lax. The 
investigators also observe that the clearance may have been too quick to give confidence that 
it was thorough. 
Pictures of the prodding tool in use were not made available, but it was believed by the 
investigators to have been inadequate. Neither the MAC authorities nor the demining group’s 
management had recognised that it was inadequate prior to the accident. However, the 
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
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